

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15

USIA-12 IO-12 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01 NEA-10

ACDA-19 GAC-01 AID-20 AGR-20 SAJ-01 IGA-02 XMB-07

RSR-01 /215 W

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R 120630 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8736

INFO USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 RABAT 1651

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MO US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY NEWSOM AND FOREIGN MINISTER BENHIMA

DISCUSS US- MOROCCAN RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY. BENHIMA GRATEFUL FOR HIS RECEPTION IN US; DESIRES STRENGTHENED US- MOROCCAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FIELDS; NEWSOM DESCRIBES LIMITATIONS ON OUR RESOURCES BUT EXPRESSES CONFIDENCE THAT WITHIN LIMITATIONS OUR POSSIBILITIES WE CAN BUILD NEW EDIFICE OF US- MOROCCAN RELATIONSHIP; US AND MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA DISCUSSED. END SUMMARY.

2. ON APRIL 9 ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM AND I CALLED UPON FOREIGN MINISTER BENHIMA FOR CORDIAL CONVERSATION WHICH LASTED OVER TWO HOURS.

3. BENHIMA BEGAN BY SAYING THAT AS RESULT HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON HE WAS CERTAIN OF ESTEEM OF US LEADERS FOR
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MOROCCO AND OF THEIR PERSONAL REGARD FOR KING HASSAN;
LATTER VERY APPRECIATIVE OF HOSPITALITY SHOWN HIS FOREIGN
MINISTER IN WASHINGTON. BENHIMA HAD TOLD KING OF HIS
FRANKNESS IN DISCUSSING MOROCCO' S PROBLEMS; THIS ATTITUDE
DID NOT MEAN THAT MOROCCO SOUGHT TO ENGAGE US IN MOROCCO' S
POLICIES; HE HAD NOT SOUGHT US " GREEN LIGHT" FOR THOSE
POLICIES.

4. GOM DOES NOT INTEND TO CAUSE MOROCCANS TO LOSE PERSONAL
LIBERTIES THEY HAVE WON AFTER SEVENTEEN YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE.
BUT THESE LIBERTIES HAVE BEEN MISUSED BY INSINCERE PEOPLE
AND GOM WILL NOT PERMIT AUTHORITY OF STATE TO BE FLOUTED.

5. ON WORLD SCENE, BENHIMA CONTINUED, THERE HAVE BEEN
MAJOR CHANGES; NEW DEMARCATION LINES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED;
HE BELIEVED DESTINY OF MOROCCO WOULD LIE IN THIS PART OF
WORLD AND IN TIES WITH EUROPE AND US. HE WAS CONCERNED
OVER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALGERIA AND LIBYA AND WONDERED
WHAT LAY BEHIND THREE MEETINGS OF THOSE TWO CHIEFS OF STATE
IN TWO WEEKS.

6. BENHIMA BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO KNOW
WHERE MOROCCO STOOD; IN RETURN MOROCCO WANTED TO KNOW IN
WHAT MEASURE US INTERESTED IN STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH
IT AND IN AIDING IT WITH ITS NEW POLICIES. WE ARE NOT ASK-
ING FOR MARINES, HE SAID; WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT ENEMIES
WE MAY HAVE IN FUTURE, BUT WE DO KNOW WE NEED CONSOLIDATE OUR
DEFENSES AND STRENGTHEN OUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; WE
NEED TO DEVOTE ALL OUR ENERGIES TO PROJECTS SUCH AS
THOSE IN AGRICULTURE TO ABSORB THOSE UNEMPLOYED WHO ARE
TARGETS OF SUBVERSION. WE WILL SEEK HELP FROM EVERY
QUARTER WHICH WILL RESPECT OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND NOT SEEK
TO EXERCISE PRESSURE UPON US.

7. FOREIGN MINISTER CONTINUED THAT US INTERESTED IN THIS
PART OF WORLD. MOROCCO KNOWS US DOES NOT WANT AN ALLIANCE;
NEITHER DOES MOROCCO. HOWEVER, US HAS MEANS OF COOPERATING
WITHOUT TREATIES.

8. BENHIMA SAID MOROCCO MUST HAVE COURAGE TO FACE SUBVER-
SION; IT SEEKS COOPERATION WITH US IN INTELLIGENCE FIELD
IN ORDER TO BE FOREWARNED; IT HOPES THAT US WITH ITS
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SERVICES CAN BE HELPFUL; MOROCCO ALSO NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN

ITS INTERNAL SECURITY. IT IS DUTY OF CHIEF OF STATE TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OF FRONTIERS AND PROTECT MOROCCO'S PROSPERITY. IN LATTER REGARD, BENHIMA CONTINUED, MOROCCO SEEKS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AS ITS OWN RESOURCES NOT SUFFICIENT. NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN WILL BE CRUCIAL; US HELPED SHAH OF IRAN DURING FIVE CRITICAL YEARS IN THAT COUNTRY; SHAH USED US ASSISTANCE WELL, AND MOROCCO SEEKS SIMILAR OPPORTUNITY ALTHOUGH IT HAS NO OIL AND MUST COUNT ON AGRICULTURAL WEALTH.

9. TURNING TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BENHIMA SAID THAT IF MOROCCO WERE TO BUY ARMS FROM USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IT WOULD BE BECAUSE IT COULD NOT GET THEM FROM ITS FRIENDS; USSR WILL MAKE ATTRACTIVE OFFER WHICH WILL COME WITHIN CLEARING AGREEMENT. FRANCE ALSO OFFERS MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT REQUIRES PURCHASE OF \$16 MILLION WORTH PER YEAR FOR EVERY \$4 MILLION WORTH PROVIDED GRATIS. MOROCCO HAS TURNED TO US AND WILL NOT GET ARMS FROM USSR IF US CAN PROVIDE. KING SPECIFICALLY WANTS MOROCCAN AIR FORCE TO BE US- SUPPLIED.

10. BENHIMA HOPED HAVE MILITARY AID NOT LIMITED TO AMOUNTS VOTED BY CONGRESS, PERHAPS OBTAINED FROM US SURPLUSES IN EUROPE AND VIET- NAM. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE SECURITY OF THIS REGION STRENGTHENED, HE THOUGHT. MINISTER PREDICTED THAT IF MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM SOLVED, RUSSIANS WILL LOSE THEIR INFLUENCE IN EASTERN ARAB STATES AND WILL SEEK OTHER PLACES IN MEDITERRANEAN TO APPLY PRESSURE; ACCORDINGLY ALGERIA IS HAPPY TO ENGAGE US VIA GAS AGREEMENT IN ORDER OBTAIN COUNTERBALANCE TO RUSSIAN INFLUENCE; MOROCCO HAPPY OVER THIS AS WELL, SINCE US WILL BE ABLE TO USE ITS INFLUENCE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN ALGERIA. " HOWEVER, WE DON' T WANT YOU TO FORGET US AND CONCENTRATE ON ALGERIA."

10. BENHIMA ASSERTED US HAD TOLD KUWAIT IN 1963 THAT IT WOULD ASSIST IT IF IRAQ INVADED; PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD DISCREETLY SENT MOROCCO ARMS IN THE MOROCCAN- ALGERIAN WAR. THESE WERE KINDS OF FORMULAE MOROCCO HOPED US WOULD NOW DEVISE FOR MOROCCO. HE ASKED THAT US NOT LET MOROCCO BECOME SECONDARY FOR IT.

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11. BENHIMA SAID HE HOPED PROMISED DETAILED STUDY OF POINTS HE HAD MADE IN WASHINGTON WOULD RESULT IN MORE FORTHCOMING RESPONSE WITH REGARD TO MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. AS IT WAS, MILITARY AID HAS NOW BEEN REDUCED TO \$10 MILLION FOR FISCAL YEAR 73. MOROCCO NEEDED " TENS OF MILLIONS" OF DOLLARS IN HELP FOR LAND REFORM PROGRAM; IT ALSO NEEDED HELP IN MODERNIZING ITS FISHING FLEET. PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO HIS WASHINGTON VISIT WAS GOOD, AS WAS NEWSOM'S PRESENCE IN RABAT, BUT IF US AID REMAINED AT CURRENT LEVEL, MOROCCO WOULD BE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AND REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT ITS FUTURE. CONGRESS MUST BE CONVINCED OF IMPORTANCE OF MOROCCO. MOROCCANS DID NOT INTEND TO THROW THEMSELVES RIGHT AND LEFT AND DID NOT WANT LARGE SOVIET PRESENCE HERE.

12. NEWSOM REPLIED US WISHES HELP MOROCCO IN MEASURE OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO OUR RELATIONS WITH IT; HE WOULD NOT REPEAT PROBLEMS WHICH HAD BEEN OUTLINED IN WASHINGTON; HE COULD UNDERSTAND HOW OUR FRIENDS MIGHT REGARD IMBALANCE
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IN OUR AID FIGURES BETWEEN SOME COUNTRIES AND OTHERS; THIS HOWEVER WAS FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE IN US AND IN SOME CASES SPECIFIC FIGURES STIPULATED BY CONGRESS; THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH TRANSFERRING FUNDS FROM SUCH ALLOCATIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAD TO CONSIDER WHAT WE COULD DO WITHIN LIMITS OF AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED BY CONGRESS FOR WORLDWIDE PROGRAMS. NEWSOM CONTINUED THAT THERE IS ALSO ENGROSSING PROBLEM OF ESTABLISHING MEANINGFUL PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THERE WAS HIGH PRIORITY OF RESOURCES FOR THIS PROBLEM. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT WE WANT TO FIND FORMULAE FOR AN ESTABLISHED LEVEL OF AID TO MOROCCO.

13. IN ECONOMIC FIELD WE NEED SPECIFIC PROJECTS; WE HAVE VARIOUS KINDS OF AID SUCH AS AID PROGRAMS, EXIM BANK LOANS, ETC. IN SOME COUNTRIES WE HAVE DISCUSSED THEIR PLANS AND ATTEMPTED TO SEE HOW OUR DIFFERENT KINDS OF AID COULD BE FITTED IN. HE COULD NOT SAY EXACTLY HOW MUCH WE COULD PROVIDE BUT WISHED TO INDICATE OUR INTEREST; TOTAL SUM COULD BE APPRECIABLE, REFLECTING TO THE WORLD IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO MOROCCO.

14. MILITARY AID WAS VERY DIFFICULT. WE HAD HAD TO SCRAPE BOTTOM OF BARREL TO PROVIDE \$10 MILLION TO MOROCCO IN FY 73. MILITARY AID VERY UNPOPULAR WITH CONGRESS; WE HAD PROVIDED FIGURES ON HELICOPTERS AND WOULD LET GOM KNOW ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF PATROL BOATS; WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO MOROCCO AND WOULD PREFER SEE IT CONTINUE GET ARMS FROM WESTERN SOURCES; HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF OUR PROBLEMS, WE COULD NOT OBJECT IF MOROCCO SHOULD GET ARMS WHEREVER IT JUDGED APPROPRIATE; WE WOULD UNDERSTAND IF IT SHOULD DECIDE TO BUY FROM USSR OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA IF WE COULD NOT PROVIDE.

15. TURNING TO PRIVATE INVESTMENT, NEWSOM SAID MOROCCO HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO CONVINCE INVESTORS THAT FAVORABLE CONDITIONS EXIST HERE. WE COULD HELP BY PUBLISHING OPPORTUNITIES AND COUNSELING MOROCCAN EXPERTS IN THIS FIELD. BENHIMA SAID THAT ESTIMATED TOTAL VALUE OF FIVE YEAR PLAN WOULD BE \$3 BILLION.

16. TURNING TO ALGERIA, NEWSOM SAID WE REGARD EACH COUNTRY AS
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TRY IN CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS; WE ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO OUR HISTORIC TIES WITH MOROCCO AND TO COOP-

ERATION WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN US. WE ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA AND APPRECIATE ROLE OF KING HASSAN IN HELPING US MAKE PROGRESS THERE. WE AND ALGERIANS TREAT EACH OTHER REALISTICALLY; THERE ARE DEEP POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US DESPITE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS; ALL THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO ALGERIA THAN TO OUR MOROCCAN OR TUNISIAN FIRENDS.

17. SUMMING UP, NEWSOM SAID WE SEEK MEANS TO ADD NEW DIMENSIONS TO OUR RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO WITHIN LIMITS OUR RESOURCES. HE BELIEVED THAT WITH MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WE COULD BUILD NEW EDIFICE.

18. BENHIMA SAID THEY WOULD NOT ONLY TURN TO US FOR ASSISTANCE BUT TO OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS FRANCE AND GERMANY. MISSION HAD LEFT TO SEEK AID FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN PERSIAN GULF. HE SUGGESTED US COULD ENCOURAGE ITS FRIENDS SUCH AS GERMANY, JAPAN AND CANADA TO HELP MOROCCO. GOM ALSO INTENDED TO ENLIST ASSISTANCE OF WORLD BANK.

19. WE SAID ONE PROBLEM FOR MOROCCO' S FRIENDS IS QUANTITY OF AID OFFERS NOT UTILIZED AT ALL, AND SLOW GOM PROGRESS IN IMPLENTING OTHERS, SUCH AS NEW AID AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT LOAN OFFER FOR \$10 MILLION. BENHIMA AGREED THIS WAS MAJOR WEAKNESS OF MOROCCAN BUREAUCRACY WHICH HAD TO BE REMEDIED.
ROCKWELL

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